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CORAM NOBIS AND THE HOFFNER CASE
PETER J. DONOGHUE t and
BENJAMIN J. JACOBSON $
S INCE the monumental decision of Matter of Lyons v. Gold-
stein 1 in 1943, prosecutors have been deluged with an
increasing number of proceedings to set aside judgments of
conviction, many of them of many years standing, upon the
ground that such judgments had been obtained in violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights. In the main, such
claims were predicated upon the assertion that a plea of
guilty had been induced by fraud or misrepresentation, 2 or
that a conviction had been obtained by the use of testimony
known by the prosecution to be perjured,3 or that the court
had failed to advise the prisoner of his right to counsel and
to inquire if he desired counsel.4 The Court of Appeals, in
People v. Sadness,5 epitomized these grounds as involving
"... the abrogation-without adequate remedy-of funda-
mental precepts either going to the jurisdiction of the court
or resulting in the perpetration of a fraud upon the court." 6
Coram nobis, as it is commonly called, is steeped in an-
tiquity. It is a descendant of an ancient common-law remedy
evolved many years ago in response to the necessities of the
times. It was conceived by the judiciary of England in the
16th Century to correct miscarriages of justice based on facts
outside the record, which could not be corrected by then
existing procedures. Since appellate review was restricted to
t Executive Assistant District Attorney of Queens County.
t Chief of the Appeals Bureau in the Office of the District Attorney of
Queens County.
'1290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
2 See note 1 supra.
3 See Matter of Morhous v. Supreme Court of New York, 293 N.Y. 131,
56 N.E.2d 79 (1944).
4 See Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1949).
5300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949).
6 Id. at 73-74, 89 N.E2d at 189.
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errors of law, it was necessary to find some avenue of relief
for the correction of injustices which would not have resulted
had certain facts been known to the trial court. Such cor-
rective device evolved into the writ of error quae coram nobis
resident, which means "let the record and proceedings remain
before us." It was not utilized to reflect upon the compe-
tency or the findings of the court. It was designed to bring
before the court facts which affected the validity and regu-
larity of the decision itself and which, had they been known
to the court, would have potentially changed the judgment
rendered. 7
In the beginning the writ was used only in civil matters,
as, for instance, where a judgment was entered against a
defendant who was under age or was a married woman, or
who had died before the verdict, facts which would have pre-
cluded the recovery of any judgment.8 A little over a century
later, this remedy was first employed in a criminal case.9
Even in England, where it was born, coram nobis was
infrequently used and had but fleeting recognition. In fact,
Blackstone made no mention of it in his Commentaries. As
was stated in Anderson v. Buchanan"' the writ "... was
hoary with age and even obsolete in England before the time
of Blackstone... ." In the early days of the United States,
when English practice was followed very closely in the courts
here, this remedy was revived briefly, though its form was
somewhat changed to meet the judicial system prevailing in
this country. In fact, it was used in New York in civil
matters, but was designated a motion in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis. 11 It apparently had fallen into disuse
in this country after that time, as it had in England. No
reported cases in this state have been found in which the writ
of coram nobis was used in civil cases after the determination
of Smith V. Kingsley 2 in 1838.
7 See Jaques v. Cesar, 2 Wins. Saund. 100, 85 Eng. Rep. 776 (1671).
8 See 1 RoLLes ABWX;mENT 747, 753-755 (1668).
9 Roy v. Cornwall, 1 Sid. 208, 82 Eng. Rep. 1060 (K.B. 1664).
10 See 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
1 See Arnold v. Sandford, 14 Johns. 417 (N.Y. 1817) ; Smith v. Kingsley,
19 Wend. 620 (N.Y. 1838).
12 See note 11 supra.
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So far as research reveals, this remedy was never in-
voked in New York in a criminal case even up to 1838. Such
vestige of legal vitality as appeared to remain in this writ in
criminal cases in New York was apparently eliminated by
the adoption in 1881 of the present New York Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. The Code provided for available remedies
from then on and expressly abolished all procedural remedies
not specifically included therein.13 Parenthetically, no pro-
vision for a remedy in the nature of, or of the type formerly
characterized as, "coram nobis" was included in the Code.
Thus, in New York State after 1881, and until the decision
in Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein . 4 in 1943, the only remedy
available to a defendant to attack a judgment of conviction
was by way of motion for a new trial 'r or by normal and
regular appellate process. Moreover, in addition to restrict-
ing the right to a new trial to the specific statutory grounds,
such remedy was available only if invoked within one year,
except where a sentence of death was imposed, in which case
the application could be made at any time prior to execu-
tion.16
13N.Y. CODE CRM. PROC. § 515.
14290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
15A motion for a new trial, as prescribed by Section 465 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, could be made only upon the following grounds:
"1. When the trial has been had in his absence if the indictment
be for a felony;
2. When the jury has received any evidence out of court other
than that resulting from a view, as provided in Section 411;
3. When the jury have separated without leave of the court, after
retiring to deliberate upon their verdict or have been guilty of any
misconduct by which a fair and due consideration of the case has
been prevented;
4. When the verdict has been decided by lot or by any means
other than a fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors;
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law
or has refused to instruct them as prescribed in Section 420; and the
defendant has, at the trial, excepted to such misdirection or refusal;
6. When the verdict is contrary to law or clearly against evidence;
7. Where it is made to appear, by affidavit, that upon another
trial the defendant can produce evidence such as, if before received,
would probably have changed the verdict if such evidence has been
discovered since the trial, is not cumulative; and the failure to produce
it on the trial was not owing to want of diligence . "
16 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 466.
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Insofar as normal appellate review was concerned, that
remedy was restricted and limited to errors in the record.
If a matter dehors the record so tainted the judgment of con-
viction as to render it a nullity, no specific remedy was made
available by the Code. Habeas corpus, under New York
law, is not a proper remedy for a convicted defendant in
possession of facts dehors the record which might upset his
conviction, since the remedy of such writ is unavailing in
attacking a judgment regular on its face.17
In this state of the law after the enactment of the Code
in 1881, it appeared that no attack upon a judgment of con-
viction could be made except by the specific procedures pro-
vided, even though there existed facts dehors the record
which might overturn a conviction.
In 1943, however, in Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein,8 the
Court of Appeals reopened the avenue to the type of relief in
a criminal case which had formerly been provided by coram
nobis, despite the apparently clear and rigid exclusion by the
legislature of all remedies except those specified in the Code.
In that case, one Joseph Bendix pleaded guilty in the Court
of General Sessions, County of New York, to the crime of
burglary in the third degree. Being a fourth offender, he
was sentenced to a term of from fifteen years to life.
In 1941, after serving five years, Bendix made a motion
in the Court of General Sessions, the court in which the judg-
ment of conviction was rendered, to set aside his conviction,
claiming that his plea of guilty had been induced by the
alleged fraud and misrepresentation of the prosecuting offi-
cial. Thereupon, the Commissioner of Correction, through
the Attorney General of the State of New York, brought a
proceeding under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to pro-
hibit the Court of General Sessions from entertaining the
motion on the ground that that court did not have jurisdic-
tion to entertain it. The predicate of that proceeding was
that Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
Section 2188 of the Penal Law provide that, once service of
17 People e.x rel. Fisher v. Morhous, 183 Misc. 51, 49 N.Y.S2d 110 (Sup.
Ct. 1944).
18 See note 14 supra.
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a sentence has commenced, it may not be suspended or inter-
rupted. The court at Special Term granted the order of
prohibition 19 and the Appellate Division unanimously af-
firmed.20  In reversing and in holding that the Court of
General Sessions had jurisdiction to entertain such a motion,
the Court of Appeals said:
The inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment which
was procured by fraud and misrepresentation cannot be doubted....
No logical distinction can be made between such power over judg-
ments in civil cases and such power over judgments in criminal cases.
There is nothing unique about a judgment or its execution in criminal
cases which excepts it from the rules applicable to judgments gen-
erally and the inherent powers of the courts with reference to them.
The power was exercised in criminal cases at common law through
the writ of error coram nobis .... If the judgment may be reviewed
and set aside on the ground that it was procured by fraud, no reason
presents itself why the court may not then permit the withdrawal of
a plea of guilty because the record is then the same as if no judgment
had ever been rendered. Indeed, it is settled that to deny a person
an opportunity to be heard on proof that he was defrauded or coerced
into pleading guilty to a crime would impair a constitutional right....
it would be an extraordinary reversal of all precedent to deny to a
competent tribunal power over its own judgments in either civil or
criminal cases.21
This far-reaching pronouncement by the Court of Ap-
peals resulted in a deluge of coram nobis motions on myriad
grounds, some meritorious but others completely baseless and
restricted in scope only by the fertile imagination and in-
genuity of incarcerated defendants. This mass attack on
judgments of convictions undoubtedly prompted the Court
of Appeals only two years later, in 1945, to serve notice that
coram nobis was not available in every conceivable situation.
In People v. Gersewitz 22 the court said:
We have sanctioned the exercise of such a power by a court
to correct its own record or to set aside an order or judgment which
was induced by fraud or procured in violation of a constitutional
19 178 Misc. 155, 33 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
20264 App. Div. 847, 36 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1942).
21290 N.Y. 19, 24-25, 47 N.E.2d 425, 428-429 (1943).
22294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E2d 427 (1945).
[ VOL. 28
1954 ] CORAM NOBIS AND THE HOFFNER CASE 239
right of a party. Perhaps that power can have no broader scope.
No case has been presented to the court in which the court was called
upon to define its exact limits, but in March, 1943, this court authori-
tatively decided (three judges dissentipg) that a court of criminal
jurisdiction has "inherent" power to set aside a judgment procured
by fraud and misrepresentation and to permit a defendant to withdraw
a plea of guilty induced by violation of his constitutional rights .... 23
And four years later, in 1949, the Court of Appeals again felt
impelled inferentially to provide a beacon for the proper
channels through which coram nobis could be pursued. As
previously indicated, in People v. Sadness 24 it was said:
On the other hand, a word should be said as to the availability
of the remedy of a writ of corar nobis in a situation of this sort. As
we have recently pointed out, it is available whenever a plea of guilty
has been induced by fraud or misrepresentation ... or where a con-
viction has been obtained by the use of testimony known by the
prosecutor to be perjured.., or where the court has failed to advise
the prisoner of his right to counsel and to inquire if he desired counsel
... all of which involve the abrogation-without adequate remedy-
of fundamental precepts either going to the jurisdiction of the court
or resulting in the perpetration of a fraud upon the court.25
Thus, while the Court of Appeals in these decisions
enumerated generally the situations in which coram nobis
was available, it apparently did not limit that avenue of re-
lief to the particular grounds passed upon in those cases.
The main principle which emerges from these decisions, how-
ever, is that coram nobis is available in cases where (1) there
is a claim of denial of due process because of the deprivation
of a constitutional right, and (2) the operative fact consti-
tuting such deprivation of due process is dehors the record.
A recent case in Queens County, not based upon any of
the three specific grounds heretofore enumerated, but coming
within the general orbit of the grounds upon which coram
nobis can properly be granted, is People v. Hoffner.28  Hoff-
ner was convicted of murder in the County Court of Queens
County, after trial on January 17, 1941, and was sentenced to
23 Id. at 167, 61 N.E.2d at 429.
24 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949).
25 Id. at 73-74, 89 N.E.2d at 189.
26 128 N.Y.L.J. 1148, col. 2 (County Ct. Nov. 13, 1952).
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life imprisonment in view of the jury's recommendation of
clemency. The Appellate Division 27 and the Court of Ap-
peals 28 both affirmed the judgment of conviction.
After Hoffner had served eleven years of his sentence, a
coram nobis motion was made on his behalf in October, 1952,
to set aside the judgment of conviction on the ground that
he had been deprived of his constitutional rights in that there
allegedly was a suppression of evidence vital to his defense. 29
Properly to evaluate the merit of that claim necessarily re-
quires a somewhat detailed review of the facts in the case in
order to determine whether the evidence claimed to have been
suppressed was of such character that, when viewed in the
perspective of all the facts in the case, its suppression con-
stituted a denial of due process of law.
Hoffner's conviction was predicated upon a fatal shoot-
ing in the course of a holdup of a barroom on August 8, 1940.
At the time of the holdup, three men were in the barroom:
William Sotzing, part owner; Peter Proestos, a bartender;
and James Halkias, a waiter. Sotzing and Proestos were
facing the cash register with their backs to the bar, engaged
in counting the day's receipts just prior to closing. Halkias
was seated in a rear booth reading a newspaper.
An unknown man entered and said: "Stick 'em up."
Sotzing, looking up, saw the gunman through the back
mirror. Halkias also looked up from his paper and, accord-
ing to his testimony, observed only the holdup man's left
profile and this for only thirty-five seconds.
Sotzing left Proestos at the cash register and started to
move toward the lower end of the bar. As he did so, the gun-
man sidled along the outside of the bar, still facing Sotzing.
While the gunman's attention was riveted upon Sotzing,
Halkias ran behind the gunman and out into the street. By
this time, Proestos had also come from behind the bar and
had reached the middle of the barroom. Two shots were fired.
27262 App. Div. 911, 29 N.Y.S.2d 726 (2d Dep't 1941).
28288 N.Y. 552, 42 N.E.2d 15 (1942).
29 A prior motion for coram nobis was denied in 1947, the court at that
time finding no evidence in the record that the verdict was induced by fraud
or that the defendant's constitutional rights had been violated in any way
or that there were any facts not already reviewed by the appellate courts.
191 Misc. 419, 76 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1947).
[ VOL.. 28
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Sotzing ran back into the barroom, saw Proestos lying on the
floor and the gunman starting for the door. Sotzing there-
upon grappled with the killer. Sotzing was, therefore, as
close as humanly possible to the killer.
When Halkias ran out the front door, he turned south
and sought refuge in the recessed doorway of an adjoining
store. As he stood there, the gunman dashed out of the bar-
room, turned north and ran to the corner where he dis-
appeared. From the recessed store entrance Halkias saw
only the back of the killer's head.
When the police arrived, Sotzing and Halkias gave them
a description of the killer. Significantly, in that description
no mention whatsoever was made of an obvious blemish
which Hoffner concededly had on his right cheek on that date.
A disinterested physician testified at the trial that on the day
of the crime he had examined Hoffner in connection with a
bone marrow transplantation which he was giving his mother,
and that Hoffner then had an obviously visible lesion about
the size of a quarter on his right cheek bone. Hoffner, him-
self, testified that he had contracted impetigo and that the
blemish was on his face from August 5, 1940, two days be-
fore the crime, to the day of his arrest, August 11, 1940, three
days after the killing. This fact was confirmed by the police
photograph taken of him at the time of his arrest.
That same morning, August 8, 1940, Sotzing and Halkias
were taken by police officers to Police Headquarters in Man-
hattan, where they were shown rogues gallery photographs.
Halkias picked out Hoffner's photograph, taken more than
five years before, as that of the killer. Parenthetically, it
should be noted that this photograph showed Hoffner full
face and right profile, whereas Halkias had viewed only the
left profile of the killer. On the basis of the selection of this
photograph by Halkias, the police arrested Hoffner on the
morning of August 11, 1940, and took him to Police Head-
quarters in Jamaica.
At 8 o'clock that morning, a line-up was conducted which
consisted of three detectives and Hoffner. The three detec-
tives were all taller, heavier and older than Hoffner. Halkias
was then ushered into the room. Despite the mentioned dis-
parities between the three detectives and Hoffner, Halkias
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failed to identify him as the killer. When this occurred, a
stenographer was present making a record of the proceedings.
According to the stenographic minutes of the line-up, when
Halkias viewed the line-up for the first time, he did see Hoff-
ner's left profile. Halkias then left the line-up room. After
an interval of some ten minutes, Halkias returned to the line-
up room, at which time the line-up had disbanded and Hoff-
ner was standing by himself in the center of the room.
According to the transcript of the line-up minutes, Halkias
walked around the defendant, and, pointing at him, then said:
"That's the man; he was in the place the other night."
Immediately after this occurred, Sotzing, who had failed
to identify Hoffner as the killer, was returned to the line-up
room for the second time. This time Sotzing requested that
Hoffner speak, apparently in an attempt to identify the voice
of the killer he had heard at the time of the holdup. Hoffner
immediately complied, even to the extent of repeating after
Sotzing the exact words which the killer had uttered at the
time of the holdup. Significantly, despite all this, the man
who had the best view of the killer again failed to identify
Hoffner, even when he was standing alone and after hearing
him utter the identical words used by the killer.
At the trial, Halkias testified that Hoffner was the killer.
Thus, the sole pivot of the People's case was such identifica-
tion by Halkas.
Cross-examined as to his failure to identify Hoffner
when he first viewed the line-up, Halkias sought to justify
such failure by asserting that in that first view he only saw
Hoffner full face and did not see his left profile. However,
the line-up minutes flatly contradicted Halkias on this, the
most vital point in the case, for the minutes showed, as pre-
viously stated, that when Halkias viewed the line-up for the
first time, those in it were instructed to "turn around."
The trial record does not show that defense counsel made
any formal request that the line-up minutes be made avail-
able to the defense for the purpose of further cross-examina-
tion of Halkias. Parenthetically, it is undisputed that such
minutes were in existence prior to and at the time of the trial.
[ VOL. 28
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In October, 1952, a motion in the nature of a writ of
coram nobis to vacate Hoffner's judgment of conviction was
made. The basis of this motion was that Hoffner's constitu-
tional rights had been violated in that defense counsel, at one
of the recesses during the trial, made an inquiry of a police
officer connected with the prosecution as to whether minutes
of the line-up had been taken and had been informed that
none had been taken. This inquiry was alleged to have been
made outside the courtroom. As the police officer was then
deceased, the District Attorney could not determine whether
this allegation was the fact or could be refuted. In this situ-
ation, the District Attorney took the position that the allega-
tion should be proved by sworn oral testimony which would
be subject to the test of cross-examination. Therefore, an
issue of fact as to a matter delhors the record was presented.
Consequently, the District Attorney consented to a hearing.
In a painstaking opinion by the Honorable Peter T.
Farrell, County Judge of Queens County,30 rendered after the
hearing, the following finding of fact was made:
In the hearing conducted by the court upon the present motion
the district attorney (who, out of a high regard for the real duties
of his office, is responsible for the disclosure) came forward with
evidence of a fact which, if known at the time of the trial, might well
have impelled the judge who presided there, to grant the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. That evidence consists of a transcript
of the stenographic record of the proceedings at the line-up and it
clearly establishes that despite his contrary testimony at the trial
Halkias did have a profile view of all the members of the line-up at
which he failed to identify Hoffner. With the case depending entirely
on this one witness it is not difficult to conclude that the trial judge,
informed of so vital an inconsistency, might have justly found the
evidence so far below the statutory standard as to require a directed
verdict.
As to the legal effect of this finding of fact upon the
judgment of conviction, the court said:
There still remains for consideration petitioner's claim that he
was deprived of due process of law in that the prosecutor failed to
3oPeople v. Hoffner, 128 N.Y.LJ. 1148, cols. 2, 3 (County Ct. Nov. 13,
1952).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
make available to the defense evidence which would legitimately tend
to overthrow the prosecution's case, to wit, the minutes of the line-up,
even though no formal request therefor was made. Although the
trial record strongly suggests that it might have been the calculated
purpose of the trial assistant to satisfy a right sense of justice by
making evident the availability of the record . . . that, unfortunately,
was not enough. There was, in the content of the record, that which
could "legitimately tend to overthrow the case made for the prosecu-
tion, or to show.., it ... unworthy of credence. . ." and there was a
resultant duty to give the defense the benefit of knowledge of that
element.... There is, in this, no criticism of a public official who, in
his lifetime, was distinguished both for his integrity and a wholesome
regard for the rights of an accused. None knows better than trial
counsel and judges the difficulties attending decisions under stress and
none know better how often the motives behind such decisions are
either doubted or misunderstood. With the security of hindsight,
though, it can be said that the duty of revelation existed under the
singular facts of this case, particularly since the unproffered minutes
of the line-up go to the very heart of the only issue in the case, to
wit, identification, even though such failure to proffer was not de-
liberate, conscious or prompted in any way by improper motive. Had
the information been made known, the course of justice might, in fair
likelihood, have been completely different. 1
Upon that determination the court vacated Hoffner's
judgment of conviction.
Of course, the ground upon which the court proceeded to
vacate this conviction is not one of the three specific grounds
heretofore mentioned upon which the Court of Appeals has
sanctioned such relief.32  The Court of Appeals had indicated
in People v. Gersewitz,33 however, that the right to such re-
lief was not limited to the three fact situations which that
court had previously passed upon in the aforecited cases. In
fact, that court had indicated in People v. Sadness 34 that
such relief is available where there is involved "the abroga-
tion-without adequate remedy-of fundamental precepts
either going to the jurisdiction of the court or resulting in
the perpetration of a fraud upon the court." The basis of
sId. at 1148, cols. 3, 4.
32 See notes 2, 3, 4 supra.
33294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945).
34300 N.Y. 69, 73-74, 89 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1949).
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the court's determination in the Hoffner case seems to come
within the orbit of the concept of "the abrogation... of
fundamental precepts... going to the jurisdiction of the
court .... " The rationale for this determination appears to
be the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Schainuok31i and People v. Walsh " that the failure of a
prosecutor to make available to a defendant evidence in the
former's possession which would legitimately tend to over-
throw the People's case is such a deprivation of a funda-
mental constitutional right as to vitiate the judgment. This
holding, however, should be restricted to the particular fact
situation in the Hoffner case for the question always remain-
ing for determination is whether the evidence not made
available is merely incidental or inconsequential or whether
it is of such weight and significance that it would legitimately
tend to overthrow the People's case. Thus, each case must be
judged on an over-all analysis of the particular facts therein.
35286 N.Y. 161, 165-166, 36 N.E2d 94, 96 (1941).
36 262 N.Y. 140, 149-150, 186 N.E. 422, 425 (1933).
